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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIra's NOy'r-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS-NO.
12299Case Threshing Machine Company vs. Deezautti-Decided
June 2, 1930.
Facts.-This was an action on a promissory note for $350.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the note had been
paid. Defendant had possession of the note and claimed payment. Plaintiff contended that the note was mailed to the
defendant by mistake, and furthermore that the note was not
marked paid. A verdict was had for the defendant and the
plaintiff alleged error in the refusal of the Court to give instruction to the effect1. That the mere fact that the plaintiff was a corporation should make no difference with the finding of the fact by
the jury.
2. That circumstantial evidence is legal evidence, and
it is often more reliable than the direct statements of witnesses.
Held.-I. It is within the discretion of the Court to
grant or refuse an instruction such as this, and there does not
appear to be any abuse of that discretion.
2. "The tendered instruction as to circumstantial evidence was properly refused, if for no other reason because
there was no proper definition of circumstantial evidence."
3. Being ample evidence to support the verdict it will
not be disturbed by this Court.
Judgment Affirmed.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL

12602-People,
PROCEEDINGS--NO.
ex rel Attorney General vs. Thomas-Decided June 16,
1930.
Facts.-The respondent, a licensed attorney for the state
of Missouri, saw an accident in which a minor was injured.
He subsequently offered to take up the case for the parents
CONTEMPT-ORIGINAL
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of the injured boy. Later, he had professional cards printed,
and after this, he petitioned for leave to take the examination
for the Colorado Bar. He filed a complaint in the above
injury case, signing himself as Attorney for the Plaintiff.
Upon consultation with a local firm, he was advised that upon
securing permission from the trial court, he could act as an
attorney in the anticipated action. The record did not show
that any such permission had been obtained, but it did show
that the respondent at all times thought that he had permission. The commissioner who conducted the hearing recommended leniency "since the respondent acted in the belief that
he was within the rule of comity and usage."
Held.-Respondent adjudged in contempt and ordered
to pay $50 and costs or to go to jail for 10 days.
CRIMINAL LAW-FIRST DEGREE MURDER ;-TIME FOR TRIAL

OF;-VENUE-MOTION FOR CHANGE OF;-ADEQUACY
PLEA OF GUILTY-RIGHT TO CHANGE;-OTHER CRIMESEVIDENCE OF-ADMISSIBILITY OF ;-MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES-EVIDENCE OF ;-INSTRUCTIONS-REFUSAL OF ;MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-REFUSAL oF-No. 12558-

George J. Abshier vs. People-DecidedJune 9, 1930.
Facts.-The defendant pleaded guilty of his activities
in the robbery of The First National Bank at Lamar, Colorado. He was convicted of first degree murder, though he
did not perform the killing himself, and was sentenced to
death. The facts are well known and will not be set out here.
Many allegations of error were set out, the important ones
being as follows: 1. The crime of which defendant was
convicted and the gist of the defense, 2. refusal of the trial
court to grant continuance of two weeks instead of six days
allowed, 3. refusal to change place of trial for alleged
prejudice of inhabitants, 4. alleged bias or prejudice of jurors,
5. refusal to permit defendant to change plea of guilty to not
guilty, 6. admission of evidence of other crimes connected
with the crime charged, 7. evidence in mitigation or aggravation of offense, 8. instructions to the jury, 9. time for presenting
motion for new trial, and denial of motion when presented.
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Held.-l. "If the homicide in question was committed
by one of his (defendant's) associates engaged in the furtherance of the common purpose to rob, he is as accountable as
though his own hand had intentionally and actually fired the
fatal shot and is guilty of murder in the first degree."
2. Six days having been allowed, the refusal of the court
to allow two weeks for the defendant's counsel to prepare their
case was not error. The gravity of the crime is not the sole
standard for determining the length of time that a defendant
shall have before he be tried. "If it were, an outlaw could
rest assured that the greater the enormity of his offense, the
longer time he would have to evade its consequences."
3. "The granting or refusal of a motion for a change of
place of trial is one of the many matters wisely lodged in the
discretion of the trial court, and in the absense of abuse, the
order will not be disturbed."
4. The most prejudicial juror named by the defendant
was one who testified that he had not arrived at any conclusion
as to the defendant's punishment, nor had this juror been
challenged for cause. There was no error here.
5. "An application to change a plea is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. Its ruling will be reversed only
for abuse of that discretion resulting in prejudice."
6. Evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant was admissible insofar as it was essential for the purpose
of placing a related story of the crime here involved before
the jury. "Where relevant evidence is offered, it may be
admitted notwithstanding it may disclose another indictable
offense." "Such evidence is also admissible to show an aggravated crime, or in mitigation if there had been any such circumstances."
7. The reason the defendant did not prove mitigating
circumstances was because there were none to prove; not because evidence thereof was excluded. The burden of proving
circumstances of mitigation is upon the defendant.
8. It is not error to refuse instructions which correspond
to those given. Nor can a party complain when the instruction given is more favorable than the one refused.
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9. It is within the discretion of the court to grant leave
to even file a motion for a new trial. Even more so, then, is
it within the courts discretion to allot the time within which
such a motion can be made.
Judgment Affirmed with orders to execute it during the
week of July 19.
No. 12,559-Howard L. Royston vs. People-Decided June
9, 1930.
The facts here involved were, with the exception of a few
details, the same as those in Abshier vs. People, ante. The
assignments of error are substantially alike, and the judgment
is sustained upon the same grounds.
Judgment Affirmed with orders to execute it during the
week of July 19.
CRIMINAL LAW-FIRST DEGREE MURDER-CONFESSIONSINDUCEMENT OF BY PROMISE OF IMMUNITY FROM DEATHJURORS - PREJUDICE OF No.
12580-Ralph E. Fleagle vs. People-Decided June 9,
1930.
Facts.-This is a companion case to Abshier vs. People,
ante; and Royston vs. People, ante. The case involves only
three elements which are not already discussed in the Abshier
case, namely: (1) The alleged agreement pertaining to the
penalty to be inflicted on the defendant; (2) Bias or prejudice
of a juror; (3) Alleged prejudicial remarks by the special
prosecutor.
Held.-(1) The defendant claims that he was promised
immunity from the death sentence in lieu of his confession.
Attorneys for the prosecution deny any such agreement, but
state that they promised not to ask for the death penalty. The
record shows that the death penalty was not asked, although
instructions which sought to direct the verdict for life imprisonment were denied.
VALIDITY OF PROMISE; -

"Jurors are constitutional officers; they have their appointed function
to perform, one of which is to fix the penalty in a case of this kind submitted
to them. The court can not lawfully usurp this power, nor set aside the legislative will, and the trial court wisely refrained from doing so when requested
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by an erroneous instruction tendered by the defense and refused. No one
may acquire a power of attorney from the jury to make a 'compact' on its
behalf."

(2)
Affidavits of statements made by one of the jurors
before trial were produced, the substance of which was that
the juror would "stay in the jury room forever before I return any verdict except one of death." This juror, by affidavit,
denied having made such a statement.
"The killing is admitted. The circumstances attending the homicide
were such as to provoke comment, and it would tend to obstruct the administration of justice, with little benefit to persons accused of crime, to hold that
remarks derogatory to a defendant would disqualify one to act as juror."

(3) Objection was made that the remarks to the jury
by the special prosecutor were too severe. "It is impossible
for us to think of any language that could have been used
stronger than the evidence itself." Even so, the court asked
the jury to disregard these remarks. "The prosecution did
not ask for the death penalty, but the evidence urged it."
Judgment Affirmed with orders that it be executed during
the week of July 12.
DECEIT -

RESTRICTION OF ALIENATION -

DAMAGES -

No.

12378-Chandlervs. Ziegler-DecidedJune 16.
Facts.-Action for deceit. Plaintiff purchased a lot from
a group owned by the defendant upon the representation that
all of the lots therein were restricted so that they could never
be sold, leased, or occupied by a colored person. Plaintiff
alleged that the lot adjoining his was sold to a Japanese.
An instruction given by the court directed the jury to
allow additional damages "sustained by reason of annoyance
and inconvenience." The jury awarded the plaintiff $400.
Held.-The evidence of the difference in the value of the
lot was sufficient to go to the jury. The error in the instruction
as to the measure of damages necessitates a reversal. "The
measure of damages where the property would be more valuable had the representation been true is the difference between
the actual value of the lot at the time of its purchase, and
what its value would have been had the representation been
true."
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(2) "A person owning a body of land and selling part
of it may, for the benefit of his remaining land, lawfully impose certain restrictions upon the use or occupancy of the land
sold."
" ...the owner of property has a right to dispose of it
with a limited restriction on its use, however much the restriction may affect the value or the nature of the estate. Repugnant
conditions are those which tend to utter subversion of the estate, such as prohibit entirely the alienation or use of the property."
Judgment Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the
question of damages only.
INTER VIvoS-LOTTERIES---No. 12298-Hardy vs.
Carrington-DecidedMay 26, 1930.
Facts.-The Western Colorado Fair purchased an automobile from the Carrington Chevrolet Company which was
raffled to the plaintiff at a fair held in Montrose, Colorado in
September 1927. The plaintiff expressed his dissatisfaction
with the car and did not take it. The plaintiff's father declared
his opposition to gambling and the final outcome was that the
father and son agreed to give whatever interest the son had
in the car back to the association, with the understanding that
it would be sold to pay premiums due from the association to
exhibitors. Pursuant to this understanding, the association
returned the car to the Carrington Company who in turn returned the purchase check to the association. Subsequently,
the plaintiff decided he wanted the car and sought to rescind
his gift. To a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff alleged
error.
Held.-'(1) "If it were necessary to pass upon the
validity of this plan or scheme to attract visitors to the fair,
we might be compelled to declare the entire plan illegal and
that the plaintiff was entitled to no relief whatever in any
view of the case."
(2) There was a valid gift by the plaintiff to the association. "The essentials of a completed gift inter vivos are: 1.
A clear and unmistakable intention to make the gift; and, 2.
GIFTS
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A consummation of such intention by those acts which the law
requires to divest the donor and invest the donee with the right
of property."
Judgment Affirmed.
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT POLICIES-SUICIDE CLAUSE-NOTICE

-No.
12464--Massachusetts Protective Association, vs.
Nora V. Daugherty.-DecidedMay 26, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff's husband carried an accident policy
with the defendant company. More than a year after the
policy was executed, the insured committed suicide. The
court found that he was insane at the time of the suicide. The
Plaintiff did not give notice of the death of the insured to
the defendant for more than two years after the suicide and
her claim then was denied by the company which called attention to the provision of the policy which provided that the
company would not be liable on the policy if the insured committed suicide while either sane or insane. Judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged error.
Held.-I. The C. L. '21, Sec. 2532 provides that suicide,
committed after one year from the issuance of a policy, while
either sane or insane, shall be no defense against the payment
of a life insurance policy. This provision has been held applicable to accident policies also.
2. Notice to the company was unnecessary in this case
because:
A. Upon learning of the invalidity of the suicide exemption provision of the policy, notice was immediately given by
the plaintiff.
B. "The absolute refusal of an insurer to pay the loss
in any event waives compliance with a provision requiring
notice and proof of loss."
Judgment Affirmed.
JUDGMENTS-MOTION TO SET ASIDE-FRAUD AS GROUNDS

FOR-No. 12415-Gardner vs. Rule-Decided June 16,
1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff was the payee in a cognovit note
made by the defendant. Without service on or appearance by

DICTA

the defendant, the plaintiff recovered judgment. More than a
year after the term in which this judgment was had, had expired, the defendant asked to have the judgment set aside,
alleging payment prior to the original action, and contending
that the judgment constituted a fraud upon him. Upon the
hearing, it was ordered that the judgment be set aside and the
defendant be permitted to answer. To the answer which
alleged payment, plaintiff filed his replication denying payment. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
The plaintiff relies chiefly upon the provision of the
code which permits relief from a judgment upon proper showing made prior to six months after the adjournment of the
term in which the judgment was rendered.
Held.-" ... a proceeding to cancel a judgment procured
by fraud is not barred by the limitation of one year..."."
a judgment thus procured is not merely a fraud upon the judgment debtor but also upon the court that gave the judgment."
Judgment Affirmed.
12489
-Greeley Gas and Fuel Co. and Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation, Ltd. vs. Thomas-Decided June 16,
1930.
Facts.-In 1919, the Plaintiff Thomas was injured while
employed by the defendant fuel company. Final judgment
was had for the plaintiff in 1929. The injury had been caused
by a third person, one Lohrey, against whom the plaintiff
secured a judgment for $10,000, which was never satisfied.
The defendant sets up two defenses, namely; the Statute
of Limitations (the Plaintiff had not given notice within the
one year as required by the statute.) and Laches. The plaintiff contended that the defendant is estopped from asserting
these defenses. The evidence which supported the plaintiff's
contention of estoppel was that the plaintiff had proceeded
against the third party upon the advice of the defendant and
with the "acquiesence and encouragement" of the insurance
company. There was no evidence of damage to the defendant
or the Insurance company because of the delay. Judgment
was had below for the plaintiff.
LACHES-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS--ESTOPPEL-NO.

DICTA

Held.-A defendant can not seek to avoid his liability by
pleading the Statute of Limitations or Laches, when the plaintiff has delayed his action with the acquiesence and encouragement of the defendant, for the express purpose of decreasing
the defendant's loss.
Judgment Affirmed.
MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE OF-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTSENDORSEMENT - EVIDENCE OF - LACHES - No. 12289-

Middlesex Safe Deposit & Trust Company vs. Frankie
Jacobs, formerly Wason, and Lily Gaffner.-Decided May
19, 1930.
Facts.-This was an action to foreclose a mortgage deed
on real estate executed by the defendant in favor of one Coram
and alleged to have been assigned to the Plaintiff. The plaintiff introduced the note, which was admitted to have been
executed, and rested. The defendant set up three affirmative
defenses of which two are considered, namely: 1. That the
note and mortgage were executed without consideration, but
merely as an act of friendship to aid Coram in securing some
ready cash, and with the understanding that the defendant
would never be held on the instruments. This defense further
alleges that she had no notice of the alleged assignment and
sale to the plaintiff until long after this assignment and sale
were supposed to have taken place. 2. That the plaintiff had
been guilty of laches insofar as it had failed to prosecute its
rights diligently, and that if the plaintiff had so proceeded,
the defendant would have had a remedy against the payee,
Coram, who had gone bankrupt long before the defendant
was given notice of this action. The lower court held for the
defendant and the plaintiff alleges error.
Held.-I. Where there is a denial of the assignment and
endorsement of a mortgage and promissory note, both the execution and the endorsement must be established by competent
proof. The mere introduction of the instrument into evidence
is insufficient.
2. When a creditor has in his hands the promissory note
of a third person as collateral for a loan to a debtor who
subsequently becomes bankrupt, it is the creditor's "duty to
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file its claim ...

in the bankruptcy proceedings, which it did

not do," before it can hold the third party.
Judgment Affirmed.
NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS-FRAUD-TRUSTEE

IN

BANK-

12 3 0 0 -Investors Finance Company vs. Joseph Bodnar-Decided
June 9,1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff sued upon a promissory note for
$750 upon which the defendant had paid $300. The plaintiff
claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value. The defendant
admitted the execution of the note, but pleaded no consideration. The answer further sets out that the payee of the note,
the Thrift Mercantile Company, had secured the defendant's
subscription to stock on representations that the Thrift Co.
would build a large store from which the plaintiff could purchase goods at a discount of 30%. The answer further states
that no stock had ever been issued to the defendant. The
replication alleged that the note was given for 100 shares of
preferred stock in the Thrift Mercantile Company, the payee
of the note, and that the Thrift Mercantile Company was
adjudicated a bankrupt. The replication further states that
this note, as part of the assets of the Thrift Company, was
turned over to the Plaintiff by the Trustee in Bankruptcy as
partial payment of a debt of $126,000 which the Thrift Company owed the plaintiff.
The evidence showed that the plaintiff company and the
Thrift Company were mostly composed of the same individuals, that they had adjoining offices, and employed the same
attorney. Judgment was had for the defendant.
The questions presented by the writ of error were:
1. Was there a failure of consideration for the note.
2. Was the plaintiff a holder in due course without
notice.
Held.-l. While the false representations here were
insufficient to sustain an action for fraud, insofar as they were
made as to the future acts of the company, the defense was
lack of consideration, not fraudulent representation. The lack
of consideration is clearly shown.
RUPTCY

IS PURCHASER

WITH

NOTICE-NO.
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2. The validity of a note in the hands of a bankrupt can
not be determined by the proceedings in bankruptcy in which
the maker of the note had no opportunity to be heard. Neither
the trustee in bankruptcy, nor those who claim under him,
can be considered as bona fide purchasers for value without
notice-they merely step into the shoes of the bankrupt.
3. An unfulfilled promise will not be deemed such consideration as will support an action to recover on a promissory
note, and as against all but a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice lack of consideration is a good defense.
Judgment Affirmed.
PARTITION-COLLATERAL ATTACK-No. 12314-Second In-

dustrial Bank vs. Marshall-DecidedJune 16, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiffseeks partition and sale of lands, alleging itself to be a tenant in common with the defendant. Defendant denied the plaintiff's interest and further alleged that
the plaintiff obtained a judgment against one "Thomas"
Marshall in justice court for $132.20, and that the justice certified a "pretended transcript" on the judgment to the district court, but that it appeared from the transcript that no
execution was ever had upon the judgment; the defendant
further alleged that "James" Marshall, the defendant's husband, had at all times been able to satisfy the justice court
judgment, and that James Marshall was the owner of an undivided half of the land in question and that the defendant
was the owner of the other undivided one half, and that the
entire property had been homesteaded. The district court
issued a fi fa pursuant to which a sheriff's deed was issued
to the plaintiff. The defendant contended that this deed was
a cloud upon her title. It was further alleged that two
months after the sheriff's deed was issued, James Marshall
tendered to the plaintiff $157.50 as full payment of principal
interest, and costs, and that this tender was refused. The
plaintiff's replication admitted all of the defendant's allegations except that the deed was a cloud on the defendant's title,
and alleged that the homestead was entered subsequent to the
date of the sheriff's deed. The court sustained a demurrer
to the replication and dismissed the suit. The writ of error
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presents these questions; (1) Must execution issue on a justice
court judgment and be returned unsatisfied, before a transcript
thereof can be legally filed? and (2) Can the plaintiff's sheriff's
deed be collaterally attacked?
Held.-It is unnecessary to answer the first question because defendant "is a stranger to plaintiff's title and has no
interest in the outcome of this action. Her attack thereon is
collateral and cannot be maintained."
Reversed and Remanded.
Note: The opinion shows no connection between Thomas
and James.
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